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uplo-51-m-15-9780810141889030115978081014188901internal-reference510610.21985/n2-rfhb-1f3415978081014190200BCB20210026in030.7in080.67020527648lb019inCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (CC BY-NC)02http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/1001RUA Series ID10102Toward an Open Monograph Ecosystem (TOME)0101Aristotle's Ontology of Change1A01Mark SentesyMarkSentesy23User DefinedPHILOSOPHY / Metaphysics23User DefinedPHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Ancient & Classical23User DefinedSCIENCE / Philosophy & Social Aspects12Metaphysics12Ontology12Penn State University12Aristotle01010300This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception of being. Mark Sentesy argues that change leads Aristotle to develop first-order metaphysical concepts such as matter, potency, actuality, sources of being, and the teleology of emerging things. He shows that Aristotle’s distinctive ontological claim—that being is inescapably diverse in kind—is anchored in his argument for the existence of change. Aristotle may be the only thinker to have given a noncircular definition of change. When he gave this definition, arguing that change is real was a losing proposition. To show that it exists, he had to rework the way philosophers understood reality. His groundbreaking analysis of change has long been interpreted through a Platonist lens, however, in which being is conceived as unchanging. Offering a comprehensive reexamination of the relationship between change and being in Aristotle, Sentesy makes an important contribution to scholarship on Aristotle, ancient philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and metaphysics.Part of the Series: Rereading Ancient PhilosophyFunded by: Penn State University as part of the TOME initiative0200This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception of being. Mark Sentesy argues that change leads Aristotle to develop first-order metaphysical concepts such as matter, potency, actuality, sources of being, and the teleology of emerging things. He shows that Aristotle’s distinctive ontological claim—that being is inescapably diverse in kind—is anchored in his argument for the existence of change. Aristotle may be the only thinker to have given a noncircular definition of change. When he gave this definition, arguing that change is real was a losing proposition. To show that it exists, he had to rework the way philosophers understood reality. His groundbreaking analysis of change has long been interpreted through a Platonist lens, however, in which being is conceived as unchanging. Offering a comprehensive reexamination of the relationship between change and being in Aristotle, Sentesy makes an important contribution to scholarship on Aristotle, ancient philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and metaphysics.Part of the Series: Rereading Ancient PhilosophyFunded by: Penn State University as part of the TOME initiative3000This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception of being. Mark Sentesy argues that change leads Aristotle to develop first-order metaphysical concepts such as matter, potency, actuality, sources of being, and the teleology of emerging things. He shows that Aristotle’s distinctive ontological claim—that being is inescapably diverse in kind—is anchored in his argument for the existence of change. Aristotle may be the only thinker to have given a noncircular definition of change. When he gave this definition, arguing that change is real was a losing proposition. To show that it exists, he had to rework the way philosophers understood reality. His groundbreaking analysis of change has long been interpreted through a Platonist lens, however, in which being is conceived as unchanging. Offering a comprehensive reexamination of the relationship between change and being in Aristotle, Sentesy makes an important contribution to scholarship on Aristotle, ancient philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and metaphysics.Part of the Series: Rereading Ancient PhilosophyFunded by: Penn State University as part of the TOME initiative2000Open Access01000302https://storage.googleapis.com/rua-uplo/files/media/cover_images/48f1f475-d0b0-45b9-aedc-43debe1c92c2.jpg01URLhttps://nupress.northwestern.edu/Northwestern University Press01Northwestern University Press01Publisher’s corporate websitehttps://uplopen.com02Publisher’s website for a specified workhttps://uplopen.com/books/m/10.21985/n2-rfhb-1f34Evanston, IL, USA040120200430The Author(s)02WORLD06159780810141896WORLD11Unknown20082020043008uplo-51-m-15-9780810141896030115978081014189601internal-reference510610.21985/n2-rfhb-1f3415978081014190200BBB20110026in030.527in081.0471957445lb019inCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (CC BY-NC)02http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/1001RUA Series ID10102Toward an Open Monograph Ecosystem (TOME)0101Aristotle's Ontology of Change1A01Mark SentesyMarkSentesy23User DefinedPHILOSOPHY / Metaphysics23User DefinedPHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Ancient & Classical23User DefinedSCIENCE / Philosophy & Social Aspects12Metaphysics12Ontology12Penn State University12Aristotle01010300This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception of being. Mark Sentesy argues that change leads Aristotle to develop first-order metaphysical concepts such as matter, potency, actuality, sources of being, and the teleology of emerging things. He shows that Aristotle’s distinctive ontological claim—that being is inescapably diverse in kind—is anchored in his argument for the existence of change. Aristotle may be the only thinker to have given a noncircular definition of change. When he gave this definition, arguing that change is real was a losing proposition. To show that it exists, he had to rework the way philosophers understood reality. His groundbreaking analysis of change has long been interpreted through a Platonist lens, however, in which being is conceived as unchanging. Offering a comprehensive reexamination of the relationship between change and being in Aristotle, Sentesy makes an important contribution to scholarship on Aristotle, ancient philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and metaphysics.Part of the Series: Rereading Ancient PhilosophyFunded by: Penn State University as part of the TOME initiative0200This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception of being. Mark Sentesy argues that change leads Aristotle to develop first-order metaphysical concepts such as matter, potency, actuality, sources of being, and the teleology of emerging things. He shows that Aristotle’s distinctive ontological claim—that being is inescapably diverse in kind—is anchored in his argument for the existence of change. Aristotle may be the only thinker to have given a noncircular definition of change. When he gave this definition, arguing that change is real was a losing proposition. To show that it exists, he had to rework the way philosophers understood reality. His groundbreaking analysis of change has long been interpreted through a Platonist lens, however, in which being is conceived as unchanging. Offering a comprehensive reexamination of the relationship between change and being in Aristotle, Sentesy makes an important contribution to scholarship on Aristotle, ancient philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and metaphysics.Part of the Series: Rereading Ancient PhilosophyFunded by: Penn State University as part of the TOME initiative3000This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception of being. Mark Sentesy argues that change leads Aristotle to develop first-order metaphysical concepts such as matter, potency, actuality, sources of being, and the teleology of emerging things. He shows that Aristotle’s distinctive ontological claim—that being is inescapably diverse in kind—is anchored in his argument for the existence of change. Aristotle may be the only thinker to have given a noncircular definition of change. When he gave this definition, arguing that change is real was a losing proposition. To show that it exists, he had to rework the way philosophers understood reality. His groundbreaking analysis of change has long been interpreted through a Platonist lens, however, in which being is conceived as unchanging. Offering a comprehensive reexamination of the relationship between change and being in Aristotle, Sentesy makes an important contribution to scholarship on Aristotle, ancient philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and metaphysics.Part of the Series: Rereading Ancient PhilosophyFunded by: Penn State University as part of the TOME initiative2000Open Access01000302https://storage.googleapis.com/rua-uplo/files/media/cover_images/48f1f475-d0b0-45b9-aedc-43debe1c92c2.jpg01URLhttps://nupress.northwestern.edu/Northwestern University Press01Northwestern University Press01Publisher’s corporate websitehttps://uplopen.com02Publisher’s website for a specified workhttps://uplopen.com/books/m/10.21985/n2-rfhb-1f34Evanston, IL, USA040120200430The Author(s)02WORLD06159780810141889WORLD11Unknown20082020043008